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Abstract

The widespread subcontracting arrangements in the engineering industry
in Pakistan are examined from the perspective of both 'vendor' and 'parent'
firms.

The nature of the contract is presented and reasons for subcontracting

are explored including credit arrangements and technological innovation
facilitated by the contract.

Cost and price mark-ups in subcontracting and

methods of contract enforcement such as various 'tying' arrangements are
reviewed.

It is concluded that subcontracting results in process rather than

product specialization to achieve division of labour and thus enables small and
large firms to coexist in the industry.

1.

Introduction

Subcontracting as a form of industrial organization is widespread in
the engineering industry in Pakistan. In agricultural machinery manufacturing,
which is an important component of Pakistan's engineering sector, the incidence
of subcontracting is striking and was noted in the course of a field
survey undertaken to study that sector (Nabi, 1984a). This follow-up study is
an attempt to present a detailed discussion of the nature of
its importance in beginning industrialization.

The study is based on a survey

of parent (firms that subcontract work out) and vendor firms (who subcontract
work in, also known as ancilliary firms in the literature) conducted in the
Punjab province of Pakistan in spring 1984.

Historically, subcontracting has been important in economic
development. In Japan, in 1966, about 310,000 enterprises (53.6 percent of all
medium and small enterprises in manufacturing) were subcontractors and they
employed 3.6 mill~on workers or more than one quarter

of the total

manufacturing labour force (Watanabe 1971). Subcontracting has also been
important in industrialized countries such as the U.S., France and Sweden. In
the U.S., as recently as the 1960's, primary government contractors were
legally required to contract out work to small subcontractors (Small Business
Administration, 1969). In France subcontractors' cooperatives were active in
the early 1960's in devising schemes to help small entrepreneurs to overcome
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problems of the prevailing recession (Levy, 1964). The success of Swedish
Association of Metalworkin g Industries contributed to promoting subcontract ing
in all four Nordic countries (Sverges Mekanforbun d, 1967). More recent examples
of successful subcontract ing are Taiwan and South Korea. In Pakistan the
beginning of automotive industry in cities like Karachi and Lahore has resulted
in rapid growth of subcontract ing.

Subcontract ing takes place in commercial constructio n as well as in
manufacturi ng activities. In this discussion, we are concerned with
subcontract ing in manufacturi ng. We focus on situations where a large parent
firm contracts out part of the production process to small vendor firms with
both contributin g importantly

to the final product. The parent firm does not

merely purchase ready made parts and components from vendor firms but actually
has a contract, formal or informal, with the vendor firm regarding quality of
work and the schedules of delivery. Such subcontract ing enables us to examine
the generally held view (elaborated in Hamid and Nabi, 1984) that small and
large scale production arrangemen ts are competing strategies in economic
developmen t. Our discussion will show that, on the contrary, subcontract ing
reflects important compliment arities between small and large scale
manufacturi ng. This suggests a special role for subcontract ing in development
strategies.
Our examination of subcontract ing arrangement s allows us to focus on
several important economic issues. One is, what determines the decision of the
firm regarding the number of processes it integrates to produce the final
product? This is related to the question of process specializat ion which will
be taken up· in our discussion. Another issue concerns inter-secto ral linkages
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in the economy. The usual argument is that for balanced growth a development
strategy that forges and exploits linkages between agricultural and
sectors of the economy is to be preferred to one that does

not foster such

interlinkages (one important reason being that linkages allow maximum
multiplier effects of investment and consumption). Subcontracting arrangements
~.

that we examine in this study forge intra-sectoral linkages and
importantly in realizing balanced growth. For subcontracting to exploit such
linkages successfully, communications between parent and vendor firms and
firm location is important and will be examined in this study.

Recent discussions of tenancy in agriculture have emphasized that
because

of market imperfections landlord-tenant relationship often extends

credit and product markets in addition to the

land market. Such market

interlinkages affect tenant behaviour and influence the outcome of

policies

aimed at increasing agricultural productivity. We find that in subcontracting
arrangements, parent firms often extend credit and technological know-how to
vendor firms. We examine how such inter-linkages in subcontracting are likely
to influence pricing decisions and the spread of technological innovation.

The study is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the
sample of parent and vendor firms that were interviewed to obtain information
on subcontracting. In section 3 we examine the following issues in detail:

(i)

Nature of the contract

(ii) Reasons for subcontracting.
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(iii) Commun ications between vendor and parent firms.

(iv) Subcont racting and the credit market.

(v)

Technol ogical innovat ion in subcont racting,

(vi) 'Tying' in subcont racting.

(vii) Costs and price mark up 1n subcont racting,

(viii) Contrac t enforcem ent.

In section 4 some economic implica tions of subcont racting are
discusse d and some policy issues conside red.

Section 2

We examine the issues enmnera ted in section 1 using two sets of data.
First we r~port the extent of subcont racting in the agricul tural machine ry
industry on the basis of data

collecte d in the field survey conducte d in the

spring of 1982 for a major study of the industry (the survey is describe d in

Nabi 1984a). The evidence as to which process es and compone nts are
subcont racted is also taken from that survey. The evidence on details of the
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contra ct was collec ted in a subseq uent survey conduc ted in spring
1984. In
sectio n we briefl y descri be this survey . Firms were select ed in
Lahore ,
Gujran wala, Faisal abad and Sheikh upura distri cts, the three distri
cts of
Pakis tan's Punjab where subco ntract ing is common.

The widesp read incide nce of subco ntract ing in Faisal abad and Lahore
corres ponds well with the experi ence in other count ries. Both

cities have a

sizeab le indus trial base (these being two of the most indus trializ
ed cities in
the count ry). The skille d labour force is large becaus e of the
presen ce of
substa ntial engine ering indus try such as textil e machin ery manuf
acturin g and
househ old durab les (gas cookin g range s, water heate rs, washin g
machi nes, fans
and water coole rs) apart from agricu ltural machi nery. Many of
the
subco ntract ing firms have been starte d by skille d worke rs in the
engine ering
indust ry who have managed to save

or borrow capita l to start their own

opera tions.

In the main field survey condu cted in 1982, 54 firms had report
ed that.·
they subco ntract out proces ses and compo nents (ie. they are paren
t firms) while /
40 had report ed that they subco ntract components in (i.e. they
are vendo r
firms ). In the follow -up survey we interv iewed all 40 vendo r firms
and 31 of
the paren t firms. Thus we hope to discus s the subco ntract ing arrang
ement s from
the twin persp ective of paren t and vendo r firms.

The cityw ise distri butio n of parent and vendor firms is given
in table
1 below:
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Table 1: Citywise Distribution of Subcontracting Firms in the Sample.
Cities

Vendor Firms

Parent Firms

Total

Lahore

11

10

21

Sheikhupura

8

8

16

Gujranwala

2

2

4

Faisalabd

19

11

30

Total

40

31

71

The firms in Sheikhupura are in that district for administrative
reasons. They are located on Sheikhupura road on the outskirts of Lahore so
that really the firms are part of Lahore's light engineering industry. In
Gujranwala we interviewed 4 subcontracting firms. These represent only the
agriculture machinery industry. Gujranwala is an important centre of the light
engineering sector in Pakistan and subcontracting in this sector is common. We
encountered several firms that subcontract work from large Lahore firms
manufacturing household durables. We did not include these firms in the sample.

Section 3.1: Subcontracting firms and the processes subcontracted.

The main field survey revealed that 104 firms (out of the 119
interviewed) manufacturing agricultural machinery are involved in
subcontracting . Fifty-four of these are pure parent firms while 40 are pure
vendor firms. Ten firms reported that they both subcontract in as well as
subcontract out, in other words they are parent-cum-ven dor firms. In table 2 we
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present evidence on variables that indicate the relative size of the firms
involved in subcontracting and their key technical ratios.

Table 2·, Mean Values of Economic Accounting Variables of Subcontracting Firms.'.:
Parent Firms

Vendor Firms

Parent-cum-Vendors

Value Added

4,39,300

1,55,363

2,98,500

Value of Machinery

2,46,613

96,765

1,06,314

Value of 'Sophisticated' Machinery to
Total Machinery
Total Labour
Skilled/Total Labours
Value Added/Labour
Value Added/Capital
Capital/labour
Notes:

0.381

21.42

5.43

11.69

0.31

0.52

0.41

20,508

28,612

'25,535

1.78
11,513

1.605
17,820

2.807
9,094

a:

b:
prices.

0.444

0~295

.

The total value of machinery owned by the firm evaluated at 1982

For details see Nabi (1984b).

It can be seen that vendor firms are smaller compared to parent firms

while the parent-cum-vendor firms fall between the two. Also, vendor firms are
more capital and skill intensive compared to parent firms.

In table 3 we report the processes and components subcontracted by the
parent firms in the industry.

!I
8

J

1
1

1
1

Table 3: Processes /Compone nts Subcontra cted by Parent Firms
Tubewel l Firms

Thresher Firms

16

38

14

11

Sheet metal cutting

0

23

Machining

8

12

12

14

4

6

Total firms subcontra cting
Subcontra cted Activity
Casting

Complete components
Painting

Tubewell firms in our sample sell the package of diesel engines and
pumps. The most important processes for these firms are casting and machining .
Casting is a specializ ed skill and most firms do not undertake it then.selve s.
Firms may choose to specializ e in the manufactu re of pump sets or diesel
engines in which case the other component is subcontra cted. Twelve of the 16
tubewell firms report subcontra cting either diesel engine or pump sets. There
is no sheet metal cutting activity in the tubewell industry.

On

the other hand,

for threshers this is the most important process requiring specializ ed
equipment and most firms subcontra ct out this process. The component most
frequentl y subcontra cted out is the thresher fan.

In the sections that follow we examine subcontra cting arrangem ents
more closely using evidence collected in the second field survey.
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Section 3.2

Nature of the Contract.·

The.interviews reveal that none of the vendor firms produce for a
single parent firm. Most vendor firms subcontract from 3 or more parent firms.
However, 70 percent of the vendors in our sample responded that one parent

dominates others in the sense that between 60-70 percent of the output is
manufactured for a single parent firm. In sections 3.6 and 3.9 we examine how
this influences negotiations regarding technical innovation and prices.

The contract between vendor and parent firms is arrived at by direct
negotiations. Only one vendor firm, located in Faisalabad, reported
subcontracted work from a firm which,- in turn, had subcontracted from a parent
firm. This, however, is the only vendor firm out of the 29 interviewed in
Faisalabad that reported this so that we cannot generalize regarding the tier
trend in subcontracting relationship even in a city that has a large
engineering industry base. Also none of the vendor firms reported
subcontracting work to secondary vendor firms. Further, only 2 firms (1 in
Lahore out of 10 interviewed and 1 in Sheikhupura out of 8 interviewed)
reported that they had obtained the contract through c01IDD.ission agents. Thus
the classic putting out system in which the commission agent plays an important
role does not appear to be at work in the subcontracting arrangements in
agricultural machinery industry of Pakistan.

The parent firms usually have more than one subcontractor. This is
partly because more than one component of the machines is subcontracted. The
other reason is that firms prefer to subcontract the same component to more
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rega rding pric e mark -up over
than one vend or to ensu re barg ainin g stren gth
in our samp le along with
cost s. The cityw ise break down of 31 pare nt firms
4.
number of thei r vend ors is repo rted in tabl e

Tabl e 4:

City

.
Breakdown of Pare nt Firm s by Number of Vend ors and by City
Tota l
6
5
4
3
2
1

Laho re

2

Shei khup ura

2

1

1

10

1

2

1

8

1

1

1

5
2

Gujr anwa la
Fais alab ad

3

6

2

Tota l

7

8

9

2
11

1

4

2

31

nt firm s is repo rted in table 5.
The number of comp onen ts subc ontra cted by pare
cted by Pare nt Firm s by City
Tabl e 5: Number of Components Subc ontra
Tota l
6
5
4
3
2
1
City
10
2
3
3
1
1
Laho re
2

Shei khup ura
Gujr anwa la

1

2

1

1

3

8
2

Fais alab ad

1

2

5

1

2

11

Tota l

2

5

10

7

7

31

7

als an inte resti ng
Tabl e 5 read in conj unct ion with tabl e 4 reve
ct more than one component to
pict ure. It appe ars that pare nt firm s subc ontra

T
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one vendor firm. Also they subcont ract more than one vendor for the same
compone nt. There seems to be little pricing advantag e in subcont racting
differen t components to the same vendor firm. This arrangem ent is undertak en
circums tances when the parent firm is very large compared to the vendor firm
· and when vendor firms have diverse enginee ring skills. Thus this practice is
most widespr ead in Lahore and its outskir ts (Sheikhu pura firms) where access
firms with diverse enginee ring skills located in Lahore is easy.

The importan ce of subcont racting in agricul tural machine ry
manufac turing can be gauged by examinin g the proport ion of the value of
subcont racted by the parent firm. This is reported in table 6.

Table 6: Value of Output Subcont racted Out by Parent Firms.
City
Lahore

½; 10%

10-19%

1

Sheikhu pura 1

2

20-29%

30-39%

40-49%

1

2

2

1

2

2

Gujranw ala
Faisalab ad

2

1

Total

4

3

2

50-59%
3

60-80%
1

Total
10

8
1

1

2

1

2

1

4

11

5

6

5

6

31

More than half the firms in our sample subcont ract out between
40-80 percent of the gross value of the output they produce . Thus
subcont racting arrangem ents constitu te a signific ant proport ion of the
manufac turing activity in the industry .
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Earlier we stated that most vendor firms negotiate directly with
parent firms without intermediaries. This is confirmed by parent firms. Only 1
out of 31 firms interviewed reported secondary subcontracting. The parent firm
involved here is located in Sheikhupura and manufactures relatively
sophisticated agricultural machinery such as mechanical reapers which lends
itself to secondary subcontracting because of the large number of components
involved •.

Our survey reveals some interesting features regarding the Choice of
vendor firms by parent firms. Only one parent firm reported that it invites
bids by vendors before awarding the contract. The remaining 30 firms choose
their vendors through references and through personal knowledge of the vendor
firm. Further insights into the selection procedure were obtained by asking the
vendor firms how they obtained the contract. Their answers are reproduced in
table 7 below:
Table 7: Breakdown of Vendor Firms by Method of Approaching Parent Firms.
City

A

Lahore

B

C

Total

5

3

11

1

8

Sheikhupura

5

2

Gujranwala

1

1

Faisalabad

7

11

1

19

Total

16

19

5

40

2

A:owner of vendor firm previously employed by parent firm.
B:Owner of vendor firm previously employed by a firm manufacturing machines

similar to parent firm machines.
C: Vendor firm owner's relative employed in the parent firm.
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Sixteen out of 40 vendor firms (40 percent) reported that they had
obtained the contract from the parent firm because the owner was previously
em.ployed in the parent firm. Nineteen vendor firms (48 percent) reported that
they bad previously been employed by firms manufacturing machinery similar to ,'
that being manufactured by the parent firm and thus had the necessary expertise

to manufacture the components. The parent firms were aware of this. Only 5
firms reported that they had obtained the contract through relatives who
for the parent firms. It is interesting that 'nepotism' is unimportant in an
industry dominated by a single (lobar) 'bradri'. The relative importance of
personal contacts in awarding contracts, compared to bidding, as revealed by
both vendor as well as parent firms, may be important at this early phase of
subcontracting. As the practice becomes more widespread and the machinery
manufactured becomes more sophisticated requiring specialized and standardized
engineering skills, parent firms are more likely to adopt formal bidding
procedures. This is likely to happen also because with greater standardization
risk associated with the manufacturing process undertaken by the vendor firms

is likely to decline.

Typically, vendor firms are small firms both regarding labour employed
(10 workers or less) as well as value of machinery owned and are considerably
smaller than parent firms (see section 3.1). There are some exceptions to this.
Two parent firms in Sheikhupura and Lahore reported that vendor firms were
larger than they were both in terms of workers employed as well as value of
machinery. The vendor firms in these two cases are large, diversified,
engineering firms of Lahore that perform specialized tasks for firms in the
engineering sector.
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section 3.3

Why Subcontract?

There are several reasons why subcontracting may come to exist. As we
have seen, agricultural machinery manufacturing is a good example of an
industry where the production cycle is not continuous. Components can be
manufactured separately and then assembled together in the final stage. The
parent firm that assembles the components to produce agricultural machinery
(assuming responsibility for its performance to the buyer) may choose to
subcontract for the following reasons:
(i) To save capital, i.e. it may not wish to purchase machinery that
requires specialized operations if these operations use up only a part of the
machine capacity. Under these circumstances it may be beneficial to subcontract
these operations to firms that specialize in that activity and perform similar
operations for other engineering firms.
(ii) To save labour particularly in terms of the specialized skills
that are required to perform operations such as those discussed above. Again it
may be feasible for a vendor firm to specialize in such operations given that
it can perform these operations for other firms in the engineering industry.
(iii) To take advantage of lower wages for similar tasks prevailing
amongst vendor firms because vendor firms rely on family labour and the labour
market may be characterized by a dual wage structure (family labour is paid
lower wages compared to labour hired in the market).
(iv) To avoid problems of labour management. Vendor firms specializing
in a few operations under the close supervision of the mechanic/owner may
realize greater effort from workers who, in any case, may be related to each
other and thus may work in a congenial environment which may contribute to
higher productivity.
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(v) To save capital costs of structures and other overheads. Vendor
firms may have lower overhead costs because they are located in owners'
dwellings. Subcontracting may thus lead to better utilization of

resources

tied up in such dwellings and underemployed family labour.
(vi) As a buffer against business fluctuations. When business is
parent firms can pass on the effects to vendor firms rather than bear all the
costs of excess capacity. This is socially desirable in view of the fact that
vendor firms take orders from many firms.manufacturing different types of
machinery so that loss of orders from one section of the industry does not
result in severe financial burden to the vendor firm.

In the survey we interviewed parent firms to elicit the importance
these reasons for subcontracting. In table 8 we reproduce their responses.

Table 8: Frequency of the Stated Reasons for Subcontracting by Parent firms.
City

A

B

C

D

E

F

Lahore

10

10

10

7

2

3

Sheikhupura

8

8

6

8

1

2

Gujranwala

2

2

Faisalabad

11

10

8

7

4

2

Total

31

30

24

24

7

7

Notes:

2

A: To save capital (machinery)

D: To avoid labour problems.

B: To save labour

E: To save capital {structures).

C: Lower wage advantage

F: Buffer against business fluctuations
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The most frequently stated reason for subcontracting is saving on
capital followed by saving on labour. Taking advantage of lower wages in vendor
firms and avoiding labour problems tie for the third important stated reason.
Saving on costs of structures is not frequently stated as an important reason.
This is surprising given that many firms are obviously short of space.
Machinery, raw material and semifinished components

clutter the shop floor.

Thus it would make sense if components are subcontracted for this reason also.
However, agricultural machinery manufacturing is seasonal so that for several
months in the year shop floor space appears to be adequate. Thus it may not
always be perceived as a binding constraint. Only 7 firms stated that
subcontracting is important as a buffer against business fluctuation. Several
of the firms who stated this reason cited the seasonality factor in the
business and were aware that overheads are reduced as a result of
subcontracting . It is worth noting also that agricultural machinery
manufacturing (excluding diesel engines)

is going through a period of high

growth associated with the early phases of farm mechanization. Expectations
regarding growth in the future are high so that, as yet, there is a lack of
awareness that this can also be an important reason for subcontracting .

The household character of vendor firms is confirmed in our survey.
Except for 2 firms with diverse engineering skills, firms have 10 or less
workers most of whom are related to firm owners. Several of the apprentices we
interviewed said that they are willing to work for.less wages in their
relative's firm compared to what they would accept in another firm because
there is no 'nokar-hakim' (servant-boss) relationship in the relative's firm.
Also they expected to get better training in the relative's firm. In another
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firm they would would be asked to do mostly unski lled work, better
skills
reserv ed for their own kith and kin. Thus it appear s that dual
labour marke t.
featur es associ ated with the nature of firm organ izatio n may be
at work and (
this facili tates subco ntract ing.

Sectio n 3.4: Locati on of Firms .

For succe ssful subco ntract ing firm lo.cati on is impor tant. Firms
locate d in Lahore and Faisal abad subco ntract a larger propo rtion
of their
components compared to other firms. The reason , of course , is
that vendo r
are more likely to locate thems elves in towns with a large and
divers e
indus trial base. The large indus trial base facili tates specia
lizatio n and thus ;
allows subco ntract ing. All the parent firms we interv iewed respon
ded that
vendo r firms were within 2 mile radius (18 firms had their vendor
s within 1
mile radius ). Distan ce is impor tant, specia lly in the early phases
of the
subco ntract ing relati onshi p, since close superv ision of the vendo
r firm
opera tions may be necess ary to ensure that specif icatio ns are
met. Althou gh
the paren t firms we interv iewed had teleph one conne ctions , only
9 report ed that
they were connec ted by teleph one to their vendo r firms. Thus person
al visits
are essen tial. In any case, we were inform ed that such visits
are extrem ely
impor tant for direct discus sions on specif icatio ns since drawin
gs and writte n
instru ctions concer ning engine ering specif icatio ns are almos t
never used.
these circum stance s physic al exami nation of the compo nents and
visual
impre ssions is what count s. For all these reason s it is impor
tant to be locate d
near vendo r firms.
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In Lahore many of the vendor firms are located in Sarai Sultan which
is adjacent to the market for scrap and pig iron. These constitute the major
raw material and a substantial proportion of the total cost of production of
vendor firms. The material is bulky and has high transportation costs. These
costs are lowered by locating the firm near the source of supply. Another
attraction of this location is the feeling of being in the market and having
easy access to information regarding demand for their product, sources of raw
material supply and technological innovation. Also there is considerble
informal exchange of machine time and engineering advice. This location
specificity of vendor firms and the need for close supervision makes parent
firms location specific as well. This may explain the concentration of light
engineering industry

in Pakistan in cities like Lahore, Faisalabad,

Gujranwala, and Sialkot.

3.5 Subcontracting and the credit market.

We have already seen (Nabi,1984b) that the credit markets serving the
light engineering sector are far from perfect. Basically, there are four broad
sources of credit. These are: government sponsored credit institutions such as
development banks and cooperatives that subsidize credit resorting to rationing
to clear the excess demand; commercial banks that charge the government fixed
lending rate plus a service charge - they also resort to rationing; back street
capital markets that charge the market clearing interest rates but borrowers
have a high probability of default; and finally, friends/relatives and self-
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generated funds. We discussed how each of these arrangeme nts work and how
influence investmen t decisions and choice of technolog y. Another borrowing -~
arrangeme nt that we discussed was suppliers ' credit and advances on machine
orders. In subcontra cting it is this last arrangeme nt that is most commonly

..

observed. We recorded many instances where parent firms extend loans to vendor
both for working capital and for purchasin g fixed assets such as machinery . In
this section we present the evidence on vendor-pa rent firm relations hip in
credit market.

Our present discussio n focuses on issues that have much in common
recent developm ents in the economics of agricultu re in developin g countries . Iri.
that literatur e it is argued that landlord- tenant relations are complex in that
they interact in credit, product, land and labour markets simultane ously. This<
market interlock ing arises from imperfect ions in markets for inputs and output:-:.
For example, a household may find it difficult to get credit or sell family
labour, so it rents land from a landowner who often also supplies credit.
Another example is that of the rural town middleman who ties up credit
availabi lity with sale of the crop. We shall see in this section and those
follow that similar interlock ing may exist in the parent-ve ndor firm
relations hip as well.

In table 9 we present the response of vendor firms to our questions
about their most important sources for financing fixed investmen t (where fixed
investmen t mainly covers additions to capital stock through purchase of
machiner y).

20

Fixed Inves tment s Of Vendor
Table 9: Most Impo rtant Sourc es For Finan cing
Firms :
F

Total

1

11

3

2

8

1

1

2

City

A

B

C

D

Lahor e

1

4

3

2

3

Sheik hupur a
Gujra nwala

E

Faial abad

1

7

4

2

1

4

19

Total

2

14

11

4

1

8

40

B:Fri ends/ relati ves

Notes : A: Paren t Firms

D: Commercial Banks

C: Self- gener ated funds

E: Government credi t banks F: Inform al stree t

marke ts.

t firms are
Only 2 of the 40 firms we interv iewed repor ted that paren
. In most cases such
the most impor tant sourc e for finan cing fixed inves tment
es and throug h
inves tment is under taken by borro wing from frien ds/re lativ
al marke ts are as
self-g enera ted funds . Inter estin gly, inform al stree t capit
. This shows that such
impor tant as paren t firms for finan cing fixed inves tment
term borrow ing •
marke ts may work well in that they enabl e relat ively long
.

,

of borrow ing in
Unfo rtuna tely, we did not get relia ble inform ation on terms
y we know that real
these mark ets. From our exper ience in the main field surve
is more than twice
inter est rates can be as high as 30 perce nt per annum which
as comm ercial banks
the comm ercial bank rate. Forma l credi t instit ution s such
and speci alize d

in
gover nment credi t instit ution s are relat ively unimp ortant

with our earli er
finan cing the purch ase of capit al stock . This is consi stent

findin gs repor ted in Nabi (1984 b).
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In section 3 .3 we stated that an importa nt reason for subcon tracting .·
is that parent firms can save on capita l. Thus it is hardly surpris ing
that
they do not lend to vendor firms to finance the purcha se of machin
ery.
.,
would tie up their capita l precis ely in the manner which they attemp t
to avoid.

through subcon tractin g. Owners of 2 vendor firms that had been
their parent firms were unhapp y about the arrange ments whereb y parent firms
only expect to jump the delive ry queue but also dictate the choice of other
parent firms particu larly when rivals are involve d. One of the vendor s
felt
that his owner always "drags him down" when his busine ss is bad by not
him to seek out other custom ers. This sounds implau sible since the parent
financ ier can always share the returns with vendors by al lowing them to
take
orders from others .

The parent firm is an import ant financ ier of workin g capita l. This
be seen in table 10 where parent firms are listed as the most importa nt
source
of borrowing by a majori ty of

vendor firms.

Table 10: Most Import ant Source s of Working Capita l of Vendor Firms.
City

A

B

C

Lahore

6

2

2

Sheikh upura

5

2

1

Gujranwala

1

1

Faisala bad

7

4

3

1

4

19

Total

19

9

6

1

5

40

Note: See table 7 for defini tion.

D

E

F

Total

1

11
8

2
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Nearly half the vendor firms intervi ewed reporte d that the most
importa nt source of borrow ing is the parent firm. Three vendor s, 1 in Lahore
s of raw
and 2 in Faisala bad, reporte d that parent firms arrange direct supplie
it was
materi al needed to manufa cture the compon ents. Most vendor s felt that
best to have own resourc es (this include s friends and relativ es) but if
their
borrow ing is essent ial, they prefer to borrow from parent firms since
Also,
terms are best. Such borrow ing does not involve the payment of intere st.
demand is less uncert ain since parent firms are commit ted to buying . The
advanta ge to

parent firms of such lending is that it enables them to work

ents
closely with vendor firms to improv e the quality of subcon tracted compon
shal 1 say
and to ensure that delive ry schedu les are met. In the next section we
more on this when

we examin e the techno logical relatio nship between parent and

vendor firms.

3.6 Subcon tractin g and Techno logy:

Accoun ts of the Japane se subcon tractin g experie nce, and the more
recent studie s of subcon tractin g in Taiwan and Korea, sugges t that this
indust rial organi zation has played an import ant role in techno logical
can be
innova tion. Broadl y speakin g, the proces s of techno logical innova tion
need for
though t to consis t of three import ant dimens ions. One is the perceiv ed
labor and
the innova tion which may depend on the relativ e prices of capita l and
is
expect ations regard ing return s to the innova tion. Anothe r (or the second)
are
the nature of engine ering skills require d for innova ting and whethe r these
and
easily access ible. The third is whethe r capita l market s functio n well
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enable the financing of innovation. Clearly, risks are associated with all
three dimensions and together they may have a compound effect on the riskiness
of the innovation. Subcontracting arrangements may encourage technological
innovation by allowing innovating parent firms to share the risk with vendor
firms by sharing their working capital. We have already seen that many parent
firms lend working capital to vendor firms. At least in the case of one large
parent firm (Millat tractors, to be discussed in section 4, which is a leading
innovating firm) we know that its vendors are able to raise working capital
with its assistance. In return for this assistance, which implies a subsidy by
the parent firm, vendors undertake to manufacture the new components.

In the previous section we saw that 19 vendor firms reported that
parent firms are the most important source for working capital. We also asked
these firms about the number of innovated components they had manufactured for
parent firms in the previous three years.The responses are recorded in table

11.

Table 11: Number of Innovated Components Manufactured by Vendors In the

Previous Three Years By whether or Not Parent Firms Lend Working Capital

None

One

Two

Three

19

5

3

4

4

11

6

4

1

Total Vendors
Parent Firm
Lends
Parent Firm
Does Not Lend

Four or More

3
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It can be seen in the table that vendor firms that have borrowin g
arrangem ents with parent firms carry out innovati ons more frequen tly compared
to vendors that do not have such arrangem ents. We now examine the technolo gical
relation ship between subcont racting firms and comment on the method by which
parent firms encourag e vendor firms to innovat e.

Component design.
Technic al drawing s are almost never used by parent firms to explain
the component design to vendor firms. The usual practice is to hand over the
prototyp e, which may be imported or designed by a rival firm, to the vendor
requirin g little modific ation. While the component is being manufac tured for
the first time the parent firm actively supervis es the process to ensure that
specific ations are met. This usually requires frequen t visits by the skilled
machini sts of parent firms. Once the newly manufac tured component is deemed
satisfac tory, such visits become rare.

Materia l and equipme nt selectio n.
There is active involvem ent of the parent firm regardin g materia l
selectio n througho ut the parent-v endor firm relation ship since the quality of
materia l, as much as vendor craftma nship, determin es the life and quality of
the compone nt. Althoug h parent firms rarely get directly involved in equipme nt
selectio n by vendors , they investig ate thoroug hly the equipme nt availab le with
vendors before awarding the contrac t. Vendors having a wide range of machinin g
equipme nt have a greater chance of being selected . For vendor firms that cast
compone nts, the range of dies and furnaces is importa nt.
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Skills training .
We observed only one parent firm which has an active program of
training vendor firm workers in skills required to manufac ture new compone nts.
This firm, Millat Tractor s, is exceptio nal and not really represe ntative of the
industry . The firm is an importa nt component of the publicly owned Automob ile
Corpora tion of Pakista n. Until 1972, when it was nationa lised, it imported
Massey- Ferguson tractors in knocked-down conditio n and assemble d them in its
plant in Lahore. It had a capacity of assembl ing two to three thousand tractors
every year. In 1980 it began a program of progres sive domestic manufac turing.
Starting with 19 percent , it increase d the domesti cally produced compone nts to
27 percent in 1981, 38 percent in 1982 and 55 percent in 1983. This involved
160 compone nts in 1980 and had gone up to 410 in 1983. The firm has a large
section which deals with vendors with departm ents speciali zing in component
design, marketin g and supervi sion. It organiz es frequen t conferen ces of
to resolve enginee ring and financi al problem s. This firm is not included in
sample of 40 parent firms being discusse d in this section .

Vendor firm groupin g.
Althoug h all the vendor firms we intervie wed expresse d a keen interes t,
in formal trade grouping s to exchang e informa tion on new methods and skills, as .·
yet no such grouping exists formall y. Informa l exchang es, as mention ed earlier ,
are common but they do not always work. Some firm owners complain ed bitterly of•
severe competi tion and the associa ted secrecy "even among people who belong to
the same lobar bradri" .
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Sec tion 3.7

'Ty ing ' in Sub con trac ting :

In our disc uss ion of the rela tion ship
betw een par ent and ven dor firm s
we saw tha t par ent firm s pro vide both
cre dit for wor king cap ital as wel l
as
tech nolo gica l adv ice to ven dor firm
s. We sha ll now exam ine whe ther this
rela tion ship res ults in the ven dor
firm get ting 'tie d' to the par ent firm
in
the sens e tha t it is una ble to perf orm
sim ilar task s for oth er firm s in the
ind ustr y. If such tyin g is wid esp read
, it is like ly to effe ct the ven dor
firm s'
abi lity to use its cap ital stoc k (ma
chin ery) inte nsiv ely and thus one of
the
ben efit s of sub con trac ting men tion ed
in sec tion 3.3 wil l be los t.

In Tab le 12 we rep ort pare nt-v end or
firm tyin g arra nge men ts. Only 9

Tab le 12: Ven dor Firm Tyin g Arr ang eme nts.
Cit

A

B

C

Lah ore

11

3

2

1

She ikhu pura

8

2

1

1

Guj ranw ala

2

Fais alab ad

19

4

3

3

Tot al

40

9

6

5

Not es: A: Tot al Number of Firm s.

D
1

1

B: Number of Ven dor Firm s rep orti ng
tyin g.

C: Number of firm s rep orti ng tyin g
only when new pro cess intr odu ced .
D: Dur atio n of tyin g: 1 yea r, 2 yea
rs, 3 yea rs.
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vendors out of the 40 we interviewed reported tying. Tying is a verbal
by the vendor firm to the parent firm that, for a specified period, it will
perform similar work for another firm. Of the 9 firms reporting tying, 6
responded that tying takes place only when the parent firm introduces, or
actively participate s, in the development of a new component. In most cases
such tying is only for one production season when the parent firm introduces
the new component. Patents are non-existen t in the industry so that rival firms
can, and often do, enter the market the following year by copying the models
developed by one firm. Thus the 'free rider' problem exists and may inhibit
technologic al innovation in the industry. Further evidence of the free rider
problem is indicated by the response by both parent as well as vendor firms
that it is hard to police such tying and that if the price is right, vendor
firms are quite likely to make the innovated component avilable to rival firms •.
However, it appears that such "copying" of innovations has at least one year
lag. Few parent firms expect the innovation to be kept hidden from rivals for
more than one year. This, to some extent, may explain why only small, gradual,
:\:

modificatio ns are made in the designs of agricultura l machinery. The other side/
of such loose tying arrangments is that vendor firms are relatively free of
production constraints of one parent firm and thus they can avoid excess
capacity in their capital stock when business is bad for one parent firm.

Section 3.8

Costs and Price Mark-up in Subcontrac ting.

We have argued that an important advantage of subcontract ing is that
parent firms can avoid access capacity in the off-peak season (and the
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organizat ional costs of obtaining and fulfillin g contracts ) and thereby achieve
lower costs of productio n compared to what they would be in the absence of
subcontra cting. This requires a careful analysis to determine whether, in fact,
the cost of producing similar componen ts under subcontra cting arrangeme nts are
different compared to the firm undertaki ng

productio n of all

component s

itself. To carry out such an analysis, detailed data on costs of vendor firms,
including imputed value of equipment time used in the productio n process,
should be collected and compared with similar cost data for firms that
manufactu re their own componen ts. Such compariso ns, in themselve s, will not be
sufficien t to establish the superiori ty or otherwise of own productio n over
subcontra cting. There may be important externali ties of undertaki ng the entire
productio n process by the parent firm which the previousl y outlined analysis
ignores. For example, parent firms' skilled workers and superviso ry labour may
become thinly spread causing inefficie ncies. Also, the shop floor may become
cluttered and congested , seriously hampering the work flow and contribut ing to
costs. All these reasons would also make subcontra cting attractiv e.

We do not have detailed data needed to examine the cost advantage of
subcontra cting as discussed above. We do, however, have informati on on

pricing

decisions in subcontra cting. A discussio n of this informati on will indicate the
relative bargainin g strengths of parent and vendor firms in arriving at
contracte d componen t prices and will shed some light on the decision to
subcontr act.

In table 13 we report firms' responses to our questions regarding
their perceptio n of the adequacy of prices they receive or pay for the
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subcont racted compone nts. After discussi ons with firms, we defined prices
adequat e if they were 15-20 percent above the cost of manufac turing
too high if they were 20-30 percent above costs and too low if they were 10-15 ,
percent above costs. Thirty out of the 40 firms we intervie wed replied that
prices paid by parent firms are adequat e while 10 felt that prices are too low.
On the other hand, 18 parent firms out of 31 intervie wed thought that prices
they paid are adequate while 13 thought prices are too high. Thus more vendor
firms (75 percent ) believe that prices are adequat e compared to parent firms
(58 percent ). We interpre t this to imply that vendor firms are more frequen tly
satisfie d with subcont racted component prices compared to parent firms who may
feel that they are driven to this arrangem ent by the high organiz ational costs
of undertak ing product ion themsel ves.

Table 13: Price-C ost Percept ions of Parent and Vendor Firms.
A

Vendor Firms
Parent Firms

13 (42%)

B

C

30 (75%)

10 (25%)

18 (58%)

Notes: A: Prices too high (20-30%) above costs.
above costs)

Total Firms
40
31

B: Prices adequat e (15-20%

C: Prices too low (10-15% above costs).

Table 14: Price Percept ions of Parent Firms Compared to Own Manufac ture
and
Vendor Firms Compared To Market Prices.
Higher

The Same

Lower

Tot al Firms

Vendor Firms

4 (10%)

24 (60%)

12 (30%)

40

Parent Firms

4 (13%)

18 (58%)

9 (29%)

31

30

An

alternative view of pricing 1n subcontracting is presented in Table

14, Here we record the response of vendor firms to our question: Are the prices

you receive for the subcontracted components higher, the same or lower than
what you would receive without subcontracting (transacting in the iromongers'

market)? The corresponding question to the parent firm was: Are the prices you
pay for subcontracting components higher, the same, or lower than the imputed
value of components had you manufactured then yourself? A majority (70 percent)
of

vendor firms reported that subcontracting prices are either adequate or

higher while a majority (87%) of parent firms believed that subcontracting
prices are the same or lower. The vendors reporting that prices are lower under
subcontracting are, in most cases, those that have 'tying' relationship with
parent firms. As we saw in section 3.7, such tying is not very widespread. The
conclusion that we draw from this evidence is that, by and large, vendor and
parent firms are better off under subcontracting since both feel that they can
do no better under alternative arrangements.

Section 3.9. Contract Enforcement.

The success of subcontracting for the parent firm lies in ensuring
that product specifications and delivery schedules are met by vendor firms,
This is determined, in part, by the material and moral incentives for
fulfilling contracts, such as goodwill in the industry, prompt payment on
delivery and advance payments on orders. Equally important are the penalties
associated with nonfulfillment. In this regard we attempted to examine the
legality of contracts in the course of the survey. We came across only one

~·~-~

iI

!

. I

:i
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parent firm (Millat Tractor s, discusse d in 3.6) that had anything
written contrac t with vendors . Even this was quite informa l. The 'contrac t'
a letter from the parent firm indicati ng the number of compone nts to be
supplied . There was nothing on delivery schedule s and component

Verbal contrac ts, of course, exist and are taken very seriousl y
in a small busines s, goodwil l and reputati on are very importa nt. Besides , as w
have seen earlier , vendor and parent firms belong to the same 'lobar' bradri.
This is also importa nt in contrac t fulfillm ent. Informa l escape clauses exist
and come into effect when circums tances leading to contrac t non-ful fillmen t
obvious , such as illness or death or bottlene cks in the supply of essentia l
materia l. When this happens , no legal machine ry is activate d. The
knows of the circums tances, since persona l supervi sion ensures close contact
with vendor firms, and makes appropr iate arrangem ents dependin g on whether
not it believes that the vendor did not willful ly break the contrac t. Only 2
parent firms in our sample reported breach of the verbal contrac t. The
firms had absconde d with advance payment s on compone nts. In both cases vendor
firms were new to the locality .

Delays in delivery of compone nts were reported frequen tly but there
were no reported penaltie s associat ed with such delays - except the threat that
no work would be subcont racted in the followin g season. This threat is rarely
carried out since the average duration of the contrac t with vendors is

5 and 8 years. It is worth noting, however , that parent firms that lend credit
and provide technic al know-how to their vendors are more likely to succeed in
contrac t enforcem ent compared to others. We grouped firms accordin g to whether
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they provided such assistance and report their responses regarding contrac.t
fulfillment in table 15.

Table 15:

Contract Fulfillment for Parent Firms Providing Assistance
A

C

( i) ( ii)

( i) (ii)

13

10

3

11

2

s 18

12

6

13

5

A: Number of Firms.

B:

.Assisting Firms
Other Parent
Notes:

D

B

unsatisfactory.

E

( i)

2

( ii)

(iii)

2

7

4

5

10

3

Delivery Schedules ( i) satisfactory, (ii)

C: Specification Schedules (i) satisfactory (ii)

unsatisfactory. D: Average contract duration (i) 1-5 years (ii) 5-8 years (iii)
8 years or more.

The vendor firm story of subcontracting is relatively more
straightforward. We came across no cases where a contract was broken
prematurely. The main issue, from vendor perspective, is payment schedules of
parent firms. Vendor firms reporting tying arrangements are, in general, more
satisfied than others regarding payment schedules. In Faisalabad 2 vendors
reported that they had stopped working for parent firms because of exceptional
delays ( 6 months in one case and 4 months in the other) in payments on
delivered components.

Unrecognized (by the government) 'federations' of agricultural
machinery manufacturers exist in all towns that we visited. ·Membership is open
to both vendor and parent firms. However, separate groupings of vendor firms do
not exist. All the vendors we interviewed expressed a keen desire to form such
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groups to exchange technical information and for financial cooperation. A
common perception is that such groups can ensure better working
parent firms particularly with regards to parent firms' payment schedules.
vendors were unanimous that this is one area where the government ought to
intervene and pro100te such groups.

Section 4: Some Economic Implications of Subcontracting.

Earlier studies of Agricultural machinery in Pakistan, by Falcon
(1967) and Child and Kenada (1975), report that large and small firms coexist•
producing a homogenous product. This view of the industry implies that there
are no. scale related barriers to entry. The existence of widespread
subcontracting arrangements that we have observed suggest, however, that
is process (or component) specialization rather than product homogegeity
industry. This is consistent with Adam Smith's view that with expansion in the,
size of the market, process specialization (division of labour), foliows. In a
growing agricultural machinery industry, which does not require a continuous
production process, large firms find it attractive to subcontract processes
components) to small firms.

Subcontracting is also implied in the classic paper by Coase (1937)
the nature of the firm. He examines the factors that discourage firms from
vertically integrating until the entire production process is carried out under
one organization. In the context of our discussion, when the net benefits of
contracting in additional services to carry out production under one firm
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organization become negative, subcontracting takes place. Thus we agree with
Aftab and Rahim 0983) that process specialization , which subc6ntr.acting
enables, is a more satisfactory explanation for the coexistence of small and
large firms in the industry compared to the alternative explanation that scale

economies do not exist as suggested by Child and Kenada.
In our discussion of subcontracting arrangements we have focussed on
the interlinkages, and complimentarit ies that exist between the small vendor
firms and the large parent firms. These inter-linkages operate primarily in the
credit market and in the exchange of technical know-how. The main
complimentarity , of course, is in terms of process or skill specialization . All
of these are important but in many ways the most important is _that for.ge4 in
the credit market. It is quite certain that many of the vendor firms would be
unable to continue operations, given that the credit market functions so
poporly, without the credit arrangements with their parent firms. The advantage
to parent firms, of course, is that it enables them to contract out processes thus saving labour, capital and organizational costs - to firms that they can
supervise closely and thus ensure that contract specifications and deli~ery
schedules are met. This is important in the absence of a formal legal machinery
for enforcing contracts. Tlrus sub-contractin g arrangements suggest that both
small and large firms co-exist in the industrializati on strategies of
developing countries. Seen in this light the debate that sees the emergence of
small and large firms as competing strategies for industrializati on ignores
important dimensions of the underlying issues.

The inter-linkages in subcontracting arrangements imply that parent
and vendor firms must be located within easily reachable distance of each
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oth er. His tori cal ly, ven dor firm s in
the eng inee ring ind ustr y wer e loca ted
sup plie s of raw mat eria l to avo id the
tran spo rtai on cos ts of the bulk y
mat eria l. Thi s resu lted in the con cen
trat ion of such firm s in spe cifi c
loc atio ns to exch ang e eng inee ring ski
lls and info rma tion on pric es of inpu
t
sou rces of demand for the ir out put .
Par ent firm s tha t wis h to sub con trac
t must
the refo re, seek out firm s thu s loc ated
. Thi s exp lain s the con tinu ed grow th
sma ll, spe cial ized ind ust rial tow ns
like Daska and Mianchannu in Pak ista
n.
One adv erse effe ct of com plim enta ritie
s betw een ven dor and pare nt
firm s is tha t they may res ult in 'tyi
ng' and thus may inh ibit the diff usio
n
inn ova tion s. The re are at lea st thre
e ways in which a car efu lly dev ised
gov ernm ent pol icy may help her e. One
is to intr odu ce, and vigo .rou sly pol
ice,
pate nt syst em. The oth er is to make
more cap ital ava ilab le to ven dors from
sou rces oth er than par ent firm s to
avo id the crea tion of mon opo lies . Thi
rdly ,
prog ram s can be init iate d tha t enc oura
ge R & D by sele cted ven dor firm s
fina nci al and tech nic al ass ista nce .
This sho uld be foll owe d up with freq
uen t
con ven tion s of par ent and ven dor firm
s to exch ange inno vate d pro cess es (thi
s
was common in Jap ane se sub con trac ting
in the firs t hal f of this cen tury ).
As we hav e argu ed, sub con trac ting forg
es imp orta nt intr a-s ect ora l
link age s, thus ena blin g maximum mu
ltip lier effe cts of demand and inve stm
ent
exp ans ion. For this to hap pen it is
imp orta nt tha t exp ans ion in demand take
s
plac e for goo ds whi ch the dom esti c
eng inee ring ski lls are cap able of
man ufac turi ng. Thus an imp ort pol icy
tha t makes combine har ves tors che aply
ava ilab le dom esti call y wil l res ult
in much of the dom esti c eng inee ring
ind ustr y, and the 'sub con trac ting link
s tha t it forg es, bein g by- pas sed .
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Finally, the benefits of subcontracting Im.1st not be the only
consideration in promoting import-substitution. Thus the success in promoting
subcontracting by Pakistan Automobile Corporation in the manufacture of cars,
trucks and tractors must not be allowed to detract from a careful analysis of
international competitiveness of the import-substituted vehicles. Watanabe
(1974) has catalogued in detail the economic losses to the society of such
'forced' subcontracting in India.
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